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Abstract  
This paper investigates a secure blind watermarking scheme. The main idea of the scheme not only 
protects the watermark information but also the embedding positions. To achieve a higher level of 
security, we propose a sub key generation mechanism based on the singular value decomposition and 
hash function, where sub keys depend on both the main key and the feature codes of the original image. 
The different sub keys ensure that the embedding positions are randomly selected for different original 
images. Watermark is embedded in the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) coefficients of the scrambled 
original image. Simulation results show that such embedded method resolves well the contradiction of 
imperceptibility and robustness. Based on good correlation properties of chaotic sequences, we design a 
detection method, which can accurately compute geometric transformation (rotation and translation 
transformations) parameters. The security analysis, including key space analysis, key sensitivity analysis, 
cryptanalysis, and the comparison results demonstrate that the proposed watermarking scheme also 
achieves high security.  
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1 Introduction  
Digital watermarking is an important technique for protecting the security of information and it is 
mainly applied in copyright protection. It has been studied more than twenty years since this concept was 
first proposed in academia [1]. Many watermarking schemes [2-12] have been proposed, among them, 
several famous algorithms such as spread spectrum (SS) [2] and quantization index modulation (QIM) [3] 
are investigated, and the earliest research effort has focused on robustness and embedding distortion. A 
watermarking system should be robust to various attacks, such as noise, general signal processing and 
 2 
 
geometric distortions, etc. How to improve robustness has been a hot issue. Some of the recent studies 
such as Ref. [4] generally represent state-of-the-art algorithm in robustness performance.  
Meanwhile, the security problem of watermarking has been attracting more and more attention. Kalker 
firstly defines watermarking security as “the inability by unauthorized users to access the communication 
channel” [13], i.e., to remove, to read, or to write the hidden the message. Later, Comesaña et al. take the 
view that the goal of security analysis is to gain secret information [14], e.g. embedding the message and 
detecting keys. In [15], Cayre et al. point out that the security analysis should be based on 
Kerckhoff’s principle [16] that means adversaries know the embedding/detecting algorithms except for a 
secret key. According to Diffie-Hellman's terminology, they group the security attacks of watermarking 
systems as (i) Watermark only attack (WOA). (ii) Known message attack (KMA). (iii) Known original 
attack (KOA). Under WOA scenario, Cayre et al. classify the security levels of watermarking schemes：
insecurity, key security, subspace security, and stego-security [17].  
In addition, some scholars make quantitative and qualitative analysis on the security of some 
algorithms,  such as SS algorithm [2] and QIM algorithm [3]. Some of watermarking systems are studied 
in real number field, and the secret keys are real numbers or vectors. On the basis of symmetric 
cryptography, Bas et al. put forward the concept of the equivalent keys to measure watermarking security 
[18]. In [3], Cayre et al. establish a general theoretical framework in information theory and analyze SS 
algorithm by Shannon's mutual information and Fisher's information matrix. Similarly, Pérez-Freire et al. 
quantitatively analyze the security of the dither modulation QIM (DM-QIM) algorithm under KMA [19] 
and WOA [20] scenarios. Their investigations show that the security of both SS and DM-QIM are still 
very low, although SS and QIM algorithms are generally agreed to have good robustness compared with 
other algorithms. In that case, it is of significant importance to improve the security of the above 
algorithms.  
Chaotic systems have received great attentions in the past decade due to its inherent properties such as 
non-periodicity, wide spectrum, sensitive to initial conditions and system parameters, and randomness 
property. Several chaos-based watermarking algorithms are proposed [5-12], where the watermark is 
embedded in the spatial domain [5-7], or in the frequency domain [8-12]. However, most of the 
algorithms are still easily analyzed from the cryptographic point of view. For example, in Refs. [9-11], 
  
 
permutation and encryption techniques are applied to protect the watermark information. We find that 
they are insecure under Kerckhoff’s principle, because we can easily access the embedding positions of 
the watermark, and then remove the watermark, or replace a new encrypted watermark, or decrypt the 
watermark. In Refs. [5-7], the chaotic sequences are used to determine the embedding positions of the 
watermark and the embedding positions depend only on the key. As long as we get enough original 
images and the watermarked images, we can obtain all the embedded positions, i.e., equivalent keys.  
In this paper, we attempt to address these security issues. The core idea of the proposed scheme 
protects not only the watermark information but also the embedding positions. First, an original 
watermark is encrypted, and then parts of the embedded positions are randomly chosen to embed the 
encrypted watermark bits. In particular, this process is not only related to the key, but also to the image 
itself, which will improve the security of the system under the WOA / KOA / KMA scenarios. The main 
contributions of this paper include: (i) The embedding domain of the proposed scheme is the DCT 
domain of the scrambled image rather than the DCT domain of the original image. Such improvements 
try to tackle the contradiction between imperceptibility and robustness; (ii) To resist rotation and 
translation attacks, a new method based on correlation properties of chaotic sequences is designed, which 
can accurately estimate geometric transformation parameters; (iii) To resist the cryptanalysis under the 
WOA / KOA / KMA scenarios, we propose a sub key generation mechanism based on the singular value 
decomposition and hash function, where sub keys depend on not only the main key but also the feature 
codes of the image.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic background and theory. 
Section 3 presents the proposed watermarking scheme in detail. The performance evaluation and security 
analysis are provided in Section 4 and Sections 5. Finally, a conclusion is drawn in Section 6. 
2 Preliminaries 
2.1 Singular value decomposition 
Singular value decomposition (SVD) is an orthogonal transform and it is defined as 
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where A  is an original matrix of size  (suppose )n m n m  , and U , V  are two orthogonal matrices 
with sizes of ,  n n m m  , respectively. S  is a singular value matrix, the singular values of which 
satisfy 
1 2 1 0.r r n            
SVD transformation has two good properties: first, singular values of an image are much less 
affected after the common image processing, such as filtering, compression. Second, singular values 
contain intrinsic algebraic image properties. Basing on the two properties, we design the robust feature 
codes of the image in Section 3.1. 
2.2 Logistic map 
Logistic map is usually used to generate chaotic sequences, and is written as  
     1 1 01 , 3.57,4 , 0,1 ,i i ix x x x                                                           (2) 
where  and
0x are the parameter and the initial state value. The digitized sequence  ik  from Logistic 
map can be generated 
  1410 mod ,  0,1,2,..., 1,  0,1,2,..., 1 ,i i ik x R i L k R                        (3) 
where the operation of x   denotes the largest integer not larger than x . 
When  = 2R in Eq. (3), a binary sequence ib can be produced as follows 
  ( 1)  , 0,1,2,..., 1  -1,1 .iki ib i L b    ，                                                   (4) 
Here we introduce auto-correlation (AC) and cross-correlation (CC) coefficients to evaluate the 
statistical properties of binary sequences. In [21], AC of  ib and CC of  ib and  ib  are defined as 
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where 0, 1, 2,...    . The two binary sequences  ib  and  ib  with different initial values are shown 
in Fig.1 (a) and (b). The auto-correlation coefficient s of  ib and the cross-correlation coefficients of 
 ib  and ib are shown in Fig.1 (c) and (d), where
310L   in Eq. (3).   
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Fig.1 The binary sequences  ib  and  ib  with different initial values in (a) and (b). (c) The auto-
correlation coefficients of  ib . (d) The cross-correlation coefficients of  ib  and ib .  
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3 Proposed watermarking scheme 
A complete digital watermarking system should consist of two parts, a transmitter and a receiver. 
The former is to embed watermark, and the latter to extract watermark. In our proposed scheme, the 
transmitter's architecture is illustrated in Fig. 2, which is composed of three processes: sub key generation 
(SKG), embedding processⅠand embedding processⅡ. In SKG sub keys are generated and depended on 
an original image and a key 1Key . In the embedding processⅠa Logo watermark is embedded in an 
original image. Further, in the embedding process Ⅱ, an oriented watermark, i.e., a binary chaotic 
sequence, is embedded in watermarked image I. In the following sections, we describe each process in 
detail, and briefly introduce extraction process.  
 
 
Fig.2 Architecture of the proposed watermarking scheme  
3.1 Sub key generation  
The framework of sub key generation is shown in Fig. 3. The goal of SKG is to produce different sub 
keys for different original images at the same main key. To better understand the mechanism, we explain 
it from two aspects of the transmitter and the receiver. 
At the transmitter side, first extract the feature codes of an original image OI by the form 
( )FC Extraction OI .                                                              (6) 
Then mix the feature codes FC and the main key 1Key  by the form  
( 1, )TM Mixing Key FC .                                                             (7) 
Embedding  
process I 
SKG 
Original  
image 
Oriented 
watermark 
 
Watermarked 
image I 
Logo 
watermark 
 
2Key  
3Key  
1Key  
SK
Embedding  
process II 
Watermarked 
image II 
  
 
In this paper, we define 1||TM Key FC ,  where the symbol ||  stands for a concatenation operation. 
Finally, calculate the hash value of TM and generate a sub key SK by the following form, 
       ( )SK Hash TM .                                                                     (8) 
 
Fig.3 Sub key generation for watermarking 
To extract watermark, the receiver must have the same SK . For non-blind watermarking schemes 
(e.g., SS scheme), the receiver can generate the same SK , but for blind watermarking schemes (e.g., DM-
QIM scheme), the original image is unavailable. Considering blind watermarking schemes, a feature code 
extraction method should meet two design requirements: 
(1) Robustness: The feature codes of the original image, the watermarked image and the watermarked 
image being attacked must be identical, i.e., the feature codes should be robust to a few common attacks.  
(2) Distinctiveness: the feature codes should be different for different images. In other words, the 
contents' feature codes are unique. 
To meet the above requirements, a simple but effective extraction method based on SVD is presented as 
follows: 
Step 1. First divide OI  into l  blocks of size    m n m n   , where
M N
l
m n m n
   
        
 , m n . Further 
divide each block into two sub blocks shown in Fig.4, the sizes of which are n n . Thus, there exist sub 
blocks 
iOI  in the image, 1,2,...,2i l . 
Step 2. Calculate the singular value 
iS  of sub blocks iOI  by Eq. (1). Then obtain the maximum singular 
value mis  for iS . 
Step 3. Compare any two different singular values mis and mjs  to obtain a feature codes sequence 
 kFC according to the following rule. 
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                          (9) 
where  1,2,..., (2 1)k l l  . 
 
Fig. 4 Each block of ( ) ( )m n m n    is divided into two sub-blocks, the sizes of which aren n . 
3.2 Embedding process I    
The embedding procedure I is depicted in Figs. 5. A binary logo watermark LW  of size H W is  
embedded in the original image OI  of size  ( )M N H W M N    , and a watermarked image I is 
produced. The embedding steps are described as follows: 
Step 1. Generate a chaotic sequence x and further get an index sequenceα . After iterating Eq. (2) with 
2Key (  and 0x ) for 500 times, we continue to iterate it until a chaotic sequence x  of length M N  is 
obtained, where  501 502 501= , ,..., M Nx x x  x . Sort the chaotic sequence x  in ascending order, and obtain a 
new sequence  
1 2
= , ,...,
M N
x x x   
   x  . Thus an index sequence  1 2, ,..., M N   α  is available. 
Step 2. Scramble the original image. The original image is scrambled by 
,   1,2,..., ,   {1,2,..., }
jj a j
SI OI j M N a M N                                              (10) 
where  and j jOI SI represent  the 
thj  pixels of the original image OI and the scrambled image SI , 
respectively. 
Step 3. The scrambled image is transformed by using DCT. 
Step 4. Encrypt the logo watermark. Take the first H W  elements in the sequence x , calculate Eq. (3), 
and obtain a binary sequence{ }, 1,2,...,ik i H W   . The logo watermark is encrypted by  
,  1,2,...,j j jw w k j H W                                          (11) 
  
 
where the symbol  denotes bitwise XOR. jw  and jw represent the 
thj elements of the original and the 
encrypted logo watermarks, respectively. 
Step 5. Generate another chaotic sequence y  and get another index sequence β . First, an initial value of 
Eq. (2) is generated from the sub key SK  by the following form 
                                    0
0
2
 
2 1
len
i
i
i
len
SK
y 


，                                                 (12) 
where
iSK denotes the
thi bit of the sub key SK , and len  the length of SK . Then, similarly as Step 1, with 
3.99999999999999  , a new chaotic sequence y  of length M N  is obtained. Similarly as the 
Step 1, sort the sequence y  to obtain another index sequence  1 2= , ,..., M N   β . 
Step 6. The encrypted logo watermark is embedded in the DCT coefficients of the scrambled image. Take 
the first H W  elements of the index sequence β  to determine the embedding positions. For example, 
the first watermark bit is embedded in the  
th
1  coefficient, the second watermark bit is embedded in the 
 
th
2  coefficient, etc.  To achieve blind extraction, QIM method [3] is used as follow 
0
1
( ) round ,                                      if 0,
( )
0.5
( ) round 0.5 ,          if  1,
i
i i
i
i
i i
c
Q c w
Q c
c
Q c w
  
      
 
          
                           (13)  
here
ic is the
thi of the selected DCT coefficient,  denotes the quantization step size, and the operation of 
round( )x  an integer to the nearest x .  
Step 7. Obtain the watermarked image I. The embedded image is transformed by using IDCT and inverse 
permutation, and the watermarked image I is obtained.  
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Fig.5 Embedding process I: a logo watermark is embedded  
3.3 Embedding process II    
To resist against geometric attacks, a binary chaotic sequence called an oriented watermark is 
embedded twice after the logo watermark is hidden. The embedding procedure II is illustrated in Fig. 6, 
and includes the following two steps: 
Step 1. Generate an oriented watermark OW . Similarly as the Step 1 of Section 3.2, a new chaotic 
sequence z  is obtained with 3Key  (  and 0z ), and the sequence length  0.5 min( , )len M N ow . Then 
applying Eq. (3) generates a binary sequence as an oriented watermark OW . 
Step 2. Construct an orientation template and embed the oriented watermark OW . Choosing the central 
position  0.5 ,  0.5M N        in the watermarked image I as a starting point (i.e., the axis origin), we 
randomly fix two symmetrical directions, 90    and 90 + , (0,90  ）, as an orientation template. 
Note that we do not need to record the two directions, but the two directions are symmetrical and their 
synthetic direction is 90 , further we define it as the marked direction. Then the oriented watermark OW  
is embedded in the two directions by using QIM method (Eq. (13)) with embedding intensity  . 
  
 
 
 
Fig.6 Embedding process II: the same oriented watermark is embedded twice in the two directions.  
Remark 1: By using QIM method, the logo watermark and the oriented watermark are embedded in the 
frequency and the spatial domains, respectively. The latter's embedding does not affect the former's when 
the embedding intensities satisfy the following form 1.5    . 
3.4 Watermark detection and extraction process 
The process is shown in Fig.7, and it can be further divided into two sub processes: the oriented 
watermark detection process and the logo watermark extraction process. The purpose of the former is to 
determine the geometric transformation parameters of the attacked image and to rectify and reshape the 
image based on these parameters, and the purpose of the latter is to extract the logo watermark from the 
reshaped image. 
The oriented watermark detection process is described as follows. 
Step 1. Similarly as step 1 in Section 3.3, construct an original oriented watermark OW  with 3Key .  
Step 2. Detect the positions and orientations of the two oriented watermarks in the received image. 
Choose the central position of the received image as a starting point (i.e., the axis origin), extract the 
possible binary sequences OW  by using Eq. (14) at the direction of  , where =1 ,2 ,3 ,...,359 ,360 . 
 , , , {0,1},argmini i k
k
ow c Q k                                                     (14) 
where
,ic  and ,iow   represent the
thi of the pixel and corresponding watermark bit, 
0Q and 1Q denote 
two different quantizers. We calculate the corresponding cross-correlation value (0)CC  between 
OW and OW  by using Eq. (5b). We plot the curve of (0)CC vs.   and find the two largest peaks, and 
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the corresponding directions are recorded
0  and 1 . Thus rotation angle of the received image can be 
calculated as the form 
1 2( )= 90 .
2
 


                                                                     (15) 
Step 3. Rectify and reshape the image. According to Eq. (15), we rotate the image counterclockwise by 
 ,  and obtain a reshaped image.  
Remark 2: Note that the image may suffer from a translation attack. In this case we can translate images 
by different distances, and then re-performing correlation detection and calculate parameters. Some 
examples of correlation detection are given in Section 4.5.  
The logo watermarking extraction process is the inverse of the embedding process I, which is briefly 
described in the following steps. 
Step 1. Obtain the sub key SK  through the SKG process with 1Key and the reshaped image. 
Step 2. Apply permutation and DCT transform on the reshaped image, and then extract the encrypted 
watermark from the DCT coefficients. Note that the embedding positions are determined by SK , extract 
the watermark bits from the coefficients of the positions using the Eq. (14).  
Step 3. Decrypt the encrypted watermark with 2Key . 
 
Fig.7 Procedure of the extracting the logo watermark 
  
 
4 Simulation results and discussions 
In this section, simulation experiments are used to verify the validity of the proposed SKG mechanism, 
then to demonstrate the superiority and effectiveness of watermark embedded in DCT domain of the 
scrambled image. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the whole watermarking system in both 
imperceptibility and robustness.  
4.1 Experimental setup and evaluation metrics 
In the following experiments, five USC-SIPI test gray-scale images with size 512 × 512 are adopted as 
the original images, including Lena, Barbara, Baboon, Peppers, and Goldhill. A 64 × 64 binary image 
(BUPT) is chosen as a logo watermark, while two binary pseudo-random sequences of 150-bit are used as 
an oriented watermark, which is determined by 3Key , i.e., 3.97986502162631   and 
0 0.64246416698522z  . The quantization steps can be used by =36 and '= 18  in the two 
embedding processes. In the SKG, we set 100,  68m n  , and 18 singular values and 153-bit feature codes 
FC  can be obtained. The simulation is implemented in MATLAB 2014a. 
To quantitatively evaluate the performance of the system, we employ various performance metrics, 
such as peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), structural similarity (SSIM) [22], normalized cross correlation 
(NC) and bit error rate (BER). PSNR and SSIM are used to evaluate the quality of the watermarked 
images or the attacked versions.  PSNR is defined by the following forms 
 
2
10
2
, ,
1 1
255
PSNR=10log
MSE
1
MSE =  ,
j Ni M
i j i j
i j
WI OI
M N

 



，
                                  (16) 
where 
, , and i j i jOI WI  denote the pixels of the original and the watermarked images.  
SSIM is defined by the form 
31 2
1 2 3
2 2 2 2
1 2 3
2 2 2
SSIM= ,X Y X Y X Y
X Y X Y X Y
C C C
C C C
 
    
     
      
    
         
                       (17) 
where  and X Y   are the means of the original image OI  and the watermarked image WI , respectively. 
 and X Y   are the variances of OI  and WI , respectively, and X Y  is the covariance between OI  and 
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WI . 1 2 31, 2, 3, ,  and C C C    are constants. SSIM ranges in [0, 1], and the larger the value, the smaller 
the image distortion.  
Meanwhile we adopt NC and BER to measure the accuracy of the extracted watermark. They are 
defined as  
1
2 2
1 1
NC= .
H W
i i
i
H W H W
i i
i i
WW
W W


 
 



 
                                                            (18) 
 'num of 
BER= .
 of  
i iFC FC
length FC

                                                           (19) 
where  and i iW W   are the i
th
 bit of the original watermark and the extracted watermark, respectively. 
 
(a)                                   (b)                                    (c) 
 
(d)                                   (e)                                       (f) 
Fig. 8 Five test gray-scale images of size 512 × 512 and a logo watermark of size 64× 64. (a) –(e)Lena, 
Barbara, Baboon, Peppers and Goldhill. (f) A logo watermark. 
4.2 Effectiveness analysis of the SKG 
4.2.1 Feature codes and sub keys for different images 
In this experiment, we extract the feature codes of different images and obtain corresponding sub 
keys. For different security levels, the lengths of the main key can be chosen 128-bit, 256-bit and 512-bit. 
In simulations, we take a 128-bits main key 1Key  and SHA3-256 algorithm with block length 1088 bits. 
We concatenate the feature codes FC  with the main key 1Key , subsequently pad zeroes such that 1088-
  
 
bit length the message is obtained, i.e., 1  00...0TM Key FC . After SHA3-256 algorithm, 256-bit sub 
key is generated.  
Table 1 shows the feature codes of five images and the corresponding sub keys. In simulations we 
arbitrarily take a 1Key  with hexadecimal format  1=bae63457983b9e7d052f5867dee30024Key . 
The simulation results show that the five different images have distinguishing feature codes, and the 
obtained sub keys have good randomness due to hash functions. 
Table 1 Different feature codes and the corresponding sub keys for different images 
Images Feature codes Sub keys 
Lena 40800102de8913ffed9a006bdf8000ff00f64d8 71cc0b895af2a238faee01a2e2db41dfafb583657bfabcdd87b5266863dd2857 
Barbara f841c3020c183f7eff800061d7870fbf7effc14 8ffce23b6edf07b01054d08732a33029e03c1361c849c4b5f459e66a273213f8 
Baboon 1eff7fff00890235ebd62048bc00f783078f718 aa562485d279bd1501601c2c5c8201e895898fb62d1380d7457087827a400b12 
Peppers 40a300cf1b3fffff3a74e9800042bd08fea87a0 3a463cbb423b9846f64a0e7b8d7fb5c1188952f8608bb4be8cdabee0b2d0bb98 
Goldhill 8000001830fefc000066cd9b276fdf3e7cff020 1388bd151a6186305f8daa447e32184bf0e87e64a5edcbbc0d3aec71acdb9263 
4.2.2 Robustness of feature codes  
The feature codes of transmitter and receiver should be identical in the watermarking system, in 
other words, the feature codes should be robust to image processing or some attacks. Assume the channel 
is ideal without noise and any attacks. We can compare the features codes of the original and the 
watermarked images, and find that the features codes of five pairs of images are synchronous. The results 
are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2 Features codes synchronization of the watermarked and the original images 
Watermarked/ Original images Lena Barbara Baboon Peppers Goldhill 
PSNR 45.57 45.50 45.64 45.67 45.55 
Features codes synchronization？ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
In fact, the channel is not ideal and there exist noise and malicious attacks. Considering image 
processing, such as compression, filtering and geometric transformation, we should investigate the 
features codes of the attacked watermarked image. In particular, we focus on the additive Gaussian white 
noise (AGWN) and JPEG compression, the results of which are shown in Table 3 and 4, respectively. As 
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can be seen from Table 3, the larger the noise variance, the worse the quality of the watermark image 
(PSNR). But the features codes are still synchronized, even when variance 20  , PSNR is reduced 
to 22.09 dB . These results represent that this method to extract features codes is robust to AWGN. 
Table 3 Additive Gaussian white noise with zero mean value against watermarked Lena.  
Variance   1 2 5 10 16 20 
PSNR(dB) 43.53 40.43 33.84 28.05 24.01 22.09 
Features codes  synchronization？ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
In Table 4, we test the different compression factors for JPEG compression, and we find that the 
features codes are synchronized if compression factor 10Q  . 
Table 4 JPEG Compression on watermarked Lena for different factors Q  
Factor Q  100 90 80 50 20 10 
PSNR(dB) 45.28 39.98 38.17 35.68 32.95 30.39 
Features codes synchronization？ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Furthermore, we test some other types of attacks, and the results are shown in Table 5. We find that the 
feature codes are synchronized under mean filtering (the filter template size is 3×3), Gaussian low pass 
filtering attacks, the rotation transformation (the rotation angle is 8°) and translation transformation (the 
translation distance is 40 pixels). But the feature codes designed by us cannot resist the cropping attack 
(the cropping ratio is 25%), because they are based on blocks.  
Table 5 Other attacks on watermarked image Lena 
Attacks Mean filtering 
(Template [3×3]) 
Gaussian low 
pass filtering 
Cropping 
(25%) 
Translation 
(40 pixels) 
Rotation 
(8°)  
PSNR(dB) 31.90 40.26 _ _ _ 
Features codes 
synchronization？ 
Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
  
 
4.3 Effectiveness of watermark embedded in the DCT domain of the scrambled image 
In the proposed scheme, the watermark is embedded in the DCT domain of the scrambled image that 
has the following two advantages: 
 (i) High embedding capacity up to ( 1)M N   bits. The DCT coefficient distribution of the scrambled 
image is similar to that of noise, which provides more embedded positions (except the direct component 
(DC) coefficient). Simulation results are shown in Fig. 9. The DCT coefficients (except DC coefficient) 
of the scrambled Lena image are distributed in [-300,300] and similarly as that of noise, while the DCT 
coefficients of the original image (except DC coefficient) are distributed in [-5200, 5200], and there are 
about 43 10  coefficients close to zero, they cannot be used as an embedded position due to being easily 
erased by image processing. To further verify that the DCT energy of the scrambled image is not 
concentrated in the upper right corner (low frequency region), we calculate the energies of the upper right 
corner of the two DCT coefficient matrices (size128 128 , but except for the DC energy), and then divide 
by the total energy of the image (also except for the DC energy), defined as energy ratio. The 
experimental results are presented in Table 6. The average energy rate of five original images is about 
90.53%, while the average energy rate of five scrambled images is about 6.26%, 
being approximately equal to the theoretical value 6.25% (i.e., (128 128 1)
(512 512 1)
 
 
).  
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Fig.9 Spatial distribution and histogram of the DCT coefficients (except the DC component). (a-b) 
Original Lena image. (c-d) Scrambled Lena image. (e-f) Noise image.  
Table 6 DCT coefficient distribution range and the energy ratios of the upper right corner of the 
(size128 128 , but except for the DC coefficient) of DCT coefficient matrices.  
Images  Attributes Lena Barbara Baboon Peppers Goldhill 
Original 
image 
Range [-5215.5, 5038.0] [-4948.4,4771.9] [-4608.3, 5230.4] [-6647.2, 7322.6] [-4306.4, 10355.2] 
Energy rate 97.08% 88.48% 73.61% 97.56% 95.95% 
Scrambled 
image  
Range [-236.9, 233.9] [-218.7, 230.1] [-224.1, 187.2] [-283.1, 296.6] [-246.7, 225.7] 
Energy rate 6.27% 6.28% 6.31% 6.25% 6.18% 
 
(ii) Robust performance is independent of the selected frequency regions. For the different regions of the 
DCT coefficient matrix of the original image, the robustness performances are different under the JPEG 
compression: the low frequency (LF) region shows best robustness, then the intermediate frequency (IF) 
region, and the high frequency (HF) region is worst. However, from the Human Visual System (HVS) 
point of view, the human's eye is very sensitive to the low frequencies and is not sensitive to the high 
frequency coefficients. To reach a compromise between robustness and visual invisibility, the watermark 
is usually embedded in the intermediate frequency region. However, the proposed scheme does not need 
to consider the embedded frequency region, because all frequency regions provide the same robust 
performance, especially under JPEG compression. In a sense, the proposed scheme solves the 
contradiction between imperceptibility and robustness. 
Next we take the simulation results and prove the above conclusion (ii). For the sake of convenience, 
we define the upper left corner of the DCT coefficients matrix (size 512×512) as the coordinate origin 
(1,1). Then we define three rectangular regions of size 64×64, LF: from coordinates (11, 11) to (74, 74); 
  
 
IF: from coordinates (221, 221) to (284, 284); HF: from coordinates (431, 431) to (494, 494). These three 
regions, LF, IF and HF, represent low, intermediate and high frequency regions for embedding watermark, 
respectively. To better verify the conclusion, we conducted two sets of comparative experiments. In the 
first set of experiments, we use the proposed scheme and embed the logo watermark in the LF, IF and HF 
regions of the five images, which produce 15 different watermarked images. Then we test these images 
under JPEG compression with different quality factors and extract the corresponding watermarks. Finally 
calculate the NC and BER values for these watermarks and calculate their mean values by embedding 
region. In another set of experiments, the only difference is that the scheme doesn’t include permutation 
process, i.e., the three embedding regions are chosen from the DCT coefficients matrix of the original 
image. The results of the two sets of experiments are shown in Figs.10 (a-b). Two conclusions can be 
drawn from the figure: (i) For the original image (OI, i.e., without permutation process), the different 
regions of the DCT coefficient matrix have different robustness performances under JPEG compression. 
LF has the strongest robustness and can resist the compression at quality factor 25Q  (Here we set the 
threshold 0.8NC   or 0.3BER  ), while HF has the weak robustness and can only resist the 
compression at 90Q  .  IF has the moderate robustness and can resist the compression at 80Q  . (ii) 
For the scrambled image (SI), the robustness performances of the different regions at 70Q   are almost 
the same.  
We present experimental results under AGWN attacks in Figs.10 (c-d). It can be seen that all the curves 
are coincident approximately, because the noise generated is independent of the images and its frequency 
distribution is evenly distributed.  
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Fig. 10 Comparisons of robustness performance in different embedding regions by using two methods. SI 
and OI stand for our proposed method and the method without permutation process, respectively. (a-b) 
JPEG compressions. (c-d) AGWN attacks. The blue dotted lines indicate the proposed scheme, and the 
red solid lines indicate that the proposed scheme without permutation process. LF, IF and HF represent 
low, intermediate and high frequency embedding regions, respectively.  
4.4 Imperceptibility evaluation of the watermarking system 
There are two watermark embedding procedures in our scheme. First, a logo watermark with 4096 bits 
capacity is embedded, and then an oriented watermark with 150 bits capacity is embedded twice. In this 
way, the watermarked images I and the watermarked images II will be output.  
Table 7 presents the values of PSNR and SSIM for the 5 test images in two embedding processes. From 
Table 7, we can observe that 45.61(dB)PSNR  and 0.99SSIM   for the watermarked images I and 
there are no declines for the watermarked image II. The results indicate that the proposed scheme has 
good image perceptual quality.  
Table 7 PSNR and SSIM of the watermarked and the original images 
Watermarked images Lena Barbara Baboon Peppers Goldhill 
Embedding I 
PSNR(dB) 45.68 45.61 45.73 45.79 45.64 
SSIM 0.99 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Embedding II PSNR(dB) 45.57 45.50 45.64 45.67 45.55 
  
 
SSIM 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
 
4.5 Robustness evaluation of the watermarking system 
To evaluate watermark robustness to common image processing operations, here we consider AGWN 
with different intensity, the JPEG compression with different quality factors, rotation and translation 
transformations, and filtering. The detailed simulation results are listed in Table 8.  
Table 8 Watermark robustness to common image processing operations. 
 
Attacks PSNR Extracted logo BER NC 
AGWN  = 1 
 
43.53 
 
0 1.00 
AGWN  = 2 
 
40.43 
 
0 1.00 
AGWN  = 5 
 
33.84 
 
0.07 0.96 
AGWN  = 8 
 
29.94 
 
0.26 0.84 
JPEG Q  = 100 45.28 
 
0 1.00 
JPEG Q  = 95 
 
41.74 
 
0 1.00 
JPEG Q  = 90 
 
39.97 
 
0.06 0.96 
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JPEG Q  = 80 
 
38.16 
 
0.23 0.86 
JPEG Q  = 75 
 
37.55 
 
0.27 0.83 
Mean filtering [3×3] 
 
31.90 
 
0.38 0.75 
Gaussian low pass 
filtering 
40.26 
 
0.03 0.98 
 
It can be seen that the proposed scheme is robust to AGWN with intensity 8  , the watermark can be 
correctly extracted with 0.26BER  and 0.84NC  . The scheme is also robust to the JPEG compression 
when 80Q  , BER  and NC  of  the extracted watermark  are  0.23 and 0.86, respectively. For filtering 
operations, it can resist Gaussian low-pass filtering, but cannot resist mean filtering. 
To verify the proposed algorithm can resist rotation and translation transformations, we do the 
following three experiments on Lena image. 
E1: Detection of the oriented watermark without geometric attack. In the embedding process II, the 
oriented watermark is embedded in 30  and 150  directions, respectively (Fig.12 (a)). The receiver 
extracts the possible binary sequences at all directions, then performs correlation detection with the 
original oriented watermark. The detection results are shown in Fig.12 (b). 
E2: Detection of the oriented watermark under a rotation attack. The watermarked image is rotated 8  
counterclockwise (Fig.12 (c)). We detect similarly as E1, and the results are presented in Fig.12 (d). 
E3: Detection of the oriented watermark under a translation attack. For simplicity, we assume that the 
watermarked image is shifted 40 pixels in 30  clockwise direction. (Fig.12 (e)). The receiver extracts the 
possible binary sequences at different shifting (in 30  clockwise direction) and performs correlation 
detection with the original oriented watermark. The results are shown in Fig.12(f). 
  
 
As can be seen from Figs.12 (b) and (d), two peaks of the correlation sequence are at 30 and 150 (in 
(b)), at 38  and 158 (in (d))，and the corresponding marked direction are  90 ( (30 +150 ) / 2 ) and  98  
( (38 +158 ) / 2 ). The marked direction  90  indicates that rotation and translation attacks have not been 
found in Fig. 12 (a), while the marked direction  98   indicates to rotate 8  counterclockwise in Fig.12 (c). 
In Fig.12 (f), obviously we conclude that the received image in Fig.12 (e) is shifted 40 pixels . 
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Fig. 12 Received images and corresponding detection results. (a-b) Without geometric attack. (c-d) 
Rotation attack with 8  counterclockwise. (e-f) Translation attack with  40 pixels in 30  clockwise 
direction.  
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5 Security analysis and comparisons 
5.1 Key space 
 The key space should be large enough to resist against brute-force attacks. The proposed system uses 
three types of keys, 1Key , 2Key and 3Key .As mentioned in 4.2.1, 1Key  is a binary string whose length 
can be 128, 256 and 512 bits. 2Key and 3Key are made up of two floating point numbers 0( , )x , 
where  0 0,1x   and  3.57,4 . In our simulation, 64-bit double precision is adopted. According to 
the IEEE floating-point standard [24], the precision of the computer is about 1510 . Thus, the key space of 
2Key or 3Key are approximately  15 14 29 9810 4.3 10 4.3 10 2     . With three modes of 1Key , the 
total key spaces are 3242 , 4522  and 7082 , respectively.  
5.2 Key sensitivity  
We first check the sensitivity of 2Key . Given a 2Key 0( , )x  and a wrong 2Key  
15(  10 ,     
15
0 0 = 10 )x x
 , we calculate corresponding scrambled images and the differential image shown in Figs. 
13(a-c).  The differential image shows the satisfactory sensitivity of 2Key because the behaviour of 
chaotic system is sensitive to the initial conditions and the parameters.  To check the sensitivity of 1Key , 
we only change 1 bit of a 1Key , i.e., bae63457983b9e7d052f5867dee30025 , to detect the 
watermark and the results are  shown in Figs. 13(d-f).  As the same as 2Key , 1Key  has a satisfactory 
sensitivity. 
                                       
(a)                                                      (b)                                                      (c) 
 
                                                                                                      
  
 
(d)                                                      (e)                                                      (f) 
 
Fig. 13 Results of key sensitivity analysis. (a-b) Scrambled image with right and wrong 2Key , 
respectively. (c) Differential image of (a) and (b). (d-e) Extracted watermark with right and wrong 1Key , 
respectively.  (f) Differential image of (d) and (e).  
5.3 Cryptanalysis under WOA / KOA / KMA scenarios 
The goal of cryptanalysis of watermarking systems is to obtain all or partial keys, or equivalent keys. 
After obtaining the keys, the attacker can do the following thing [24]: unauthorized embedding, 
unauthorized decoding and unauthorized removal. The security of the proposed scheme mainly depends 
on 1Key  and 2Key , where 1Key  and the feature codes of the image together determine the embedding 
position, and 2Key  is used to scramble the original image and encrypt the logo watermark.  
Now we analyze the whole watermarking system under different attack scenarios. In the WOA 
scenario, the attacker obtains only a series of watermarked images. Assume that he/she made some 
statistical analysis in the spatial domain of the watermarked images, but it is difficult to analyze in this 
case. Because the watermark bit is embedded in the different DCT coefficients for different original 
images, and after IDCT transform, the watermark bit will spread to the whole space domain.  
In the KOA scenario, an attacker can obtain some watermarked images and the corresponding original 
image. An attacker may best use a differential attack method, i.e., he/she calculates the difference 
between the watermarked image and the original image to get some information about the keys. But the 
differences are not the identical, because the selected embedding coefficient depends on not only 1Key  
but also the feature codes of different image. So it is difficult to recover the keys.  
In the KMA scenario, an attacker collect several  watermarked image and watermarks pairs. In this 
case, he/she may establishes mapping relationship from different watermarks to different watermarked 
images. It is also difficult to break the system, because as long as the image contents or the feature codes  
are changed, the embedding positions of the watermark will be changed.  
To further demonstrate the high security of the system, we assume that some of the keys are leaked, 
i.e., or permutation matrix is known to the attacker. The attacker will performs the permutation and DCT 
transform, then he can guess the embedding position and the embedding order of the watermark. The 
probability of success can be calculated as the following form 
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sucess_1 64 64 64 64
512 512 64 64
1
= 6.09 10 ,
C A
P
 
 
                                       (20) 
This shows that it is almost impossible to extract the correct encrypted watermark without 1Key . 
Furthermore, suppose the attacker already has a part of the sub keys, he/she will predict the main key or 
the other sub key with less cost. The difficulty of breaking SKG is equivalent to break hash functions. 
Based on the above analysis, the security of the proposed watermarking system with SKG is greatly 
enhanced by one-way hash functions and one-time pad mechanism. 
5.4 Comparisons with other schemes 
In this section, we compare our  scheme with two representative watermarking schemes, Liu's scheme 
[9] and Behina's scheme [5].They are both blind watermarking algorithm with the secret keys, and simple 
description of the two algorithms are given here. 
Liu's scheme [9]. First, an original watermark is scrambled based on Logistic maps. Then a scrambled 
watermark is embedded in the sub-band LL2 of  DWT coefficients. Note that the parameters of the 
Logistic system are the secret keys of the watermarking system. 
Behina's scheme [5].Three chaotic sequences are generated based on a coupling chaotic system, two of 
which are used to determine which pixels of the original image and the other to determine which bit-plane 
in the pixels to embed watermark using the substitution method. The parameters of coupling chaotic 
system are the secret keys of the watermarking system.  
The comparison results are listed in Table 9. For Liu's scheme, based on Kerckhoff’s principle, an 
attacker is very easy to access the positions of embedding watermark bits. Under WOA or KOA scenarios, 
He/she can do the following illegal operation, for example, remove the watermark by modifying the DWT 
coefficients of the watermarked image, extract the encrypted watermark by using same rules, and then 
embed the extracted encrypted watermarks into other images (i.e., forge the encrypted watermark into a 
new image). Under the KMA attack, the attacker maybe obtains some original watermarks. By Li's 
analytical methods [26], only  2log 64 64 =12  (where 64 64 denotes the size of the watermark used in 
[9]) different known watermarks are needed to acquire the equivalent key, i.e., the permutation matrix.  
For Behina's scheme, we know that the embedding positions in the spatial domain are completely 
dependent on the keys, so the set of all embedding positions can be regarded as the equivalent key of the 
  
 
system. When a certain pixel of the original image is different from that of the watermarked image, it 
determines an embedded position. The probability of successful confirmation can be estimated by the 
following equation 
sucess_2
1
1 .
2
num
P
 
   
 
                                                                  (21) 
When  5num   and  10num  , approximately 96.9% and 99.9% of the embedding positions were 
revealed, respectively. Through these embedding positions and extracted watermark, attackers can erase 
the watermark and move the watermark into a new image. 
Basing on the above analysis, we know that Liu's scheme is insecure under WOA, KOA and KMA 
scenarios, and Behina's scheme is insecure under KOA scenario. However it is very difficult to analyze 
our scheme under these scenarios. 
 
Table 9 The comparisons of the proposed algorithm, Liu's scheme [9], and Behina's scheme [5] 
Attribute description Proposed scheme Liu's scheme[9] Behina's scheme[5] 
Embedding domain 
The DCT domain of 
the scrambled image 
and space domain 
DWT domain Space domain 
Keys composition 
Embedding position 
key 1Key and 
encryption key and 
permutation key 2Key   
Only watermark 
encryption key 
Only embedding 
position key 
Geometric 
attacks 
Rotation  
(8°) 
√ × × 
Translation
(40 pixels) 
√ × × 
Cropping 
(5%) 
× √ √ 
Cryptanalysis 
WOA Difficult Easy access to the 
embedding positions 
Difficult 
KOA Difficult Easy access to the 
embedding positions 
Easy access to the 
embedding 
position 
KMA Difficult Easy access to the Difficult 
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embedding positions 
and decode the 
encrypted watermark 
Annotations: √ indicates can resist against such an attack and × cannot. 
6 Conclusions 
A blind watermarking scheme is presented in the paper, which enhances the security of the 
algorithm by protecting the watermark information and the embedding positions. For realization of the 
secrecy of embedding positions, we have proposed a sub key generation (SKG) mechanism that can 
generate different sub keys for different images. During the embedding process I, a logo watermark is 
embedded in the DCT domain of the scrambled image. During the embedding process II, a binary chaotic 
sequence called the oriented watermark is hidden in the spatial domain. Simulation results show that the 
proposed scheme has good invisibility and good robustness. In addition, they can resist the rotation attack 
and the translation attack. Moreover, a number of simulation results and analysis, such as key length 
analysis, key sensitivity analysis, cryptanalysis under WOA / KOA / KMA scenarios and comparison 
with other algorithms, demonstrate that the scheme achieve a high level of security. 
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